To determine whether hospital ownership was associated with preventable adverse events, the authors reviewed the medical records of a random sample of 15,000 hospitalizations in Utah and Colorado in 1992. Hospitals were categorized as nonprofit, for-profit, major teaching government (e.g., county, state ownership), and minor or nonteaching government. Multivariate analyses adjusting for other patient and hospital characteristics found that, when compared with patients in nonprofit hospitals, patients in minor or nonteaching government hospitals were more likely to suffer a preventable adverse event of any type (odds ratio (OR), 2.46; 95 percent confidence interval (95% CI), 1.45 to 4.20); preventable operative adverse events (OR, 4.85; 95% CI, 2.44 to 9.62); and preventable adverse events due to delayed diagnoses and therapies (OR, 4.27; 95% CI, 1.48 to 12.31). Patients in for-profit hospitals were also more likely to suffer preventable adverse events of any type (OR, 1.57; 95% CI, 1.03 to 2.38); preventable operative adverse events (OR, 2.63; 95% CI, 1.42 to 4.87); and preventable adverse events due to delayed diagnoses and therapies (OR, 4.15; 95% CI, 1.84 to 9.34). Patients in major teaching government hospitals were less likely to suffer preventable adverse drug events (OR, 0.38; 95% CI, 0.16 to 0.89).
growth of managed care decreased financial support for public hospitals during the 1980s and 1990s (5, 6) , thus raising concern about the quality of care.
Most of the literature on ownership and quality of care addresses for-profit and nonprofit hospitals. In the 1960s, concerns about the effect of the free market on the practice of medicine were clearly elucidated by Arrow (7) , and in the 1980s many prominent observers argued that for-profit hospitals operating under freemarket principles would erode the profession's ethic, place the financial health of stockholders and physicians above the physical health of patients, and thereby decrease the quality of medical care (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) . In essence, these authors believed that the interests of stockholders conflicted with patient interests.
Yet empirical research based on data from the early 1980s did not find differences in quality of care between for-profit and nonprofit hospitals (13) (14) (15) (16) , nor did research find that corporate influence encouraged management intervention in medical practice (17) . Studies evaluating quality of care in government-owned hospitals also failed to demonstrate quality problems (13) .
Much of this research, however, was conducted prior to the 1990s-a time characterized by aggressive competition between hospitals and increasing pressure by employers and insurers on nonprofit and for-profit hospitals to decrease costs (18, 19) . In fact, one recent study did find that Medicare patients in teaching hospitals had a 25 percent lower mortality rate than Medicare patients in for-profit hospitals (20) . The financial climate for some government-owned hospitals has also become less generous (6) . These financial pressures are worrisome given that several studies have found an association between a hospital's financial characteristics and the quality of care as measured by negligent injuries (21) , mortality rates (22) , and peer review (23) .
Given these concerns about hospital ownership, the changing hospital market, and the lack of recent research, we analyzed data on preventable adverse events from Utah and Colorado in 1992 to determine their association with hospital ownership.
METHODS

Sampling Strategy
We cooperated with the Utah Health Data Committee and the Colorado Hospital Association to sample hospital discharges in 1992. First, we characterized all hospitals in each state according to size (less than 8,000 discharges per year or 8,000 or more discharges per year); location (urban or rural); teaching status (major, minor, or nonteaching); and ownership (for profit, nonprofit, or government). These characteristics came from the American Hospital Association Guide to Hospitals (24) and the Health Care Investment Analysts' Directory of U.S. Hospitals (25) and were confirmed by co-investigators from each state. Nonteaching hospitals had no interns or residents and were not affiliated with the Council of Teaching Hospitals (COTH); minor teaching hospitals had residency training programs but were not affiliated with COTH; and major teaching hospitals had residency programs and were members of COTH.
Next we created strata representing all possible combinations of these characteristics, and every hospital in each state was assigned to its appropriate stratum (12 hospitals in Utah and 15 in Colorado). At least one hospital was then chosen from each stratum based on its potential interest in participating in a no-fault medical malpractice demonstration project. No hospitals refused to participate, and the investigators had no knowledge of the hospitals' adverse event rates. Psychiatric, rehabilitation, and drug or alcohol treatment diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) and hospitals that exclusively provide these services were excluded, as were Veterans Administration hospitals.
The Utah Health Data Committee randomly sampled 5,000 discharges from calendar year 1992, and the Colorado Hospital Association randomly sampled 10,000 discharges from calendar year 1992 in their comprehensive hospital discharge data sets. The number of records sampled in each hospital was proportional to the number of each hospital's discharges relative to the total discharges of all hospitals in the study.
Record Review
First, 31 trained nurses reviewed the medical record for one of 18 criteria associated with an adverse event. Records screened positive were referred to one of 22 local physicians (board-certified family practitioners or internists) who were trained to use the Adverse Event Analysis Form (26) . This form uses a series of questions to facilitate reliable detection of adverse events.
The reviewers described the event, graded their confidence that an adverse event had occurred, and classified the type of event by choosing one of ten mutually exclusive categories: (1) incorrect or delayed diagnosis; (2) postoperative complication; (3) fracture-related event; (4) anesthesia-related event; (5) postpartum-related event; (6) neonatal-related event; (7) medical procedure; (8) adverse drug event; (9) incorrect or delayed therapy; and (10) fall-related event. Because the adverse events in categories 1 and 9 resulted from similar types of errors, and relatively few events of these types were found, they were collapsed into one group. If more than one adverse event was found, the event that caused the most disability was counted and classified. Specialist consultation was available for the reviewing physicians if requested. The review was conducted by a Colorado-based team of nurses and physicians in Colorado, and by a separate Utah team in Utah.
Because judgments about adverse events can be complex, we used a six-point confidence scale in which 1 indicates little or no evidence that medical management caused the event; 2, slight evidence; 3, not quite likely (less than 50:50 but close call); 4, more likely than not (greater than 50:50 but close call); 5, strong evidence; and 6, virtually certain evidence. The reliability and validity of this process was evaluated during the Harvard Medical Practice Study (26) . We used forms identical to those used in New York except we added two screening criteria (numbers 17 and 18 in the Appendix).
An analysis of the Harvard Medical Practice Study data found that much of the disagreement between reviewers occurred among those who had markedly low and high adverse event detection rates (27) . In this study, we addressed reliability in three ways. First, we standardized physician and nurse training by conducting only two training sessions for each group (one in each state), and the sessions were conducted by the same two investigators. The Harvard Medical Practice Study had several training sessions conducted by multiple trainers. Second, we conducted a quality control study to identify physicians with low and high adverse event detection rates. Third, we conducted an in-depth reliability study.
Definition of Variables
An adverse event was defined as an injury caused by medical management (rather than the disease process) that resulted in either prolonged hospital stay or disability at discharge. We required a confidence score of 4 or greater from the reviewing physician to indicate the presence of an adverse event. As in other studies (28) , preventability was then independently judged by two study investigators who were blinded to all hospital characteristics, using the same six-point confidence scale and requiring a score of 4 or greater to indicate preventability. An adverse event was considered preventable if it was avoidable using any means currently available, unless those means were not considered a standard of care. Preventable adverse events were a subset of all adverse events. For example, many adverse events, such as those related to idiosyncratic drug allergies of an individual, are not preventable.
The patient characteristics used as covariates were gender, race (white and nonwhite), age (0-15 years, 16-44 years, 45-64 years, and over 65 years), and payer (uninsured, Medicare, Medicaid, private/other, and managed care). Comorbid illness was measured using the Charlson comorbidity index (29) . We also recorded DRG level as a measure of case mix. This variable was created by grouping DRGs into four levels according to the a priori clinical likelihood that they would be associated with an adverse event (24) . Age, gender, DRG, and payer were obtained from the state discharge databases and confirmed by the chart reviewers. Race and Charlson score were obtained using data from the medical record.
The hospital characteristics included teaching status, location, and size, as defined above. We classified ownership as nonprofit, for-profit, major teaching government, and minor or nonteaching government. The division of governmentowned hospitals is explained below under "Statistical Analysis."
Quality Control
To identify physician reviewers with an unacceptably high false-negative rate, a study investigator (EJT) re-reviewed 50 randomly selected records of physician reviewers whose adverse event detection rate was two standard deviations (SD) below the mean for the group of reviewers in their respective state. If 10 percent or more of the records were classified as an adverse event by the investigator, their reviews were substituted with re-reviews by a different reviewer who was blinded to the purpose of the re-review. To address false-positive reviews, investigators EJT and TAB also reviewed all adverse event data forms and excluded adverse events that did not meet the study definition.
Reliability of Physician Judgments
After completion of the review, we re-reviewed a random sample of 500 records referred by nurses to physicians on the basis of the 18 criteria, maintaining the original 2:1 ratio of Colorado records to Utah records (333 from Colorado and 167 from Utah). Four hundred of these records were previously judged to have no adverse event and 100 to have adverse events. This mix of records provided a sample with a proportion of adverse events similar to that in the original review. Six physicians in Colorado and four in Utah reviewed the records, none of which they had previously reviewed. As in the original review, investigators reviewed all adverse events detected during the re-review and eliminated any false-positive reviews.
Statistical Analysis
Preventable adverse event rates are reported as the observed percentage of discharges with preventable adverse events. We analyzed only the preventable adverse events whose management definitely occurred in a sampled hospital, as opposed to during an office visit prior to the hospitalization.
In our database, all major teaching hospitals were government owned, so any multivariate models that contained only the three ownership categories (for-profit, nonprofit, and government-owned) would implicitly contain an interaction term that would be difficult to interpret. We chose to simplify the interpretation, without altering the fit of the models, by explicitly combining government ownership and major teaching status into a single composite predictor.
We examined the relations among hospital ownership (major teaching government, minor or nonteaching government, for-profit, nonprofit) and preventable adverse events using logistic regression. Our goal was to determine if patients' risk of suffering preventable adverse events depended on the ownership of the hospital to which they were admitted. Therefore, the unit of analysis was the patient, and we adjusted for other specific hospital and patient characteristics. Nonprofit hospital ownership was used as the reference group because this characteristic defined the largest group of hospitals in our sample (and in the United States).
Other variables in each model included hospital teaching status, size, and location, and patient age, race, gender, insurance coverage (payer), and Charlson score. The adjustment for correlation of adverse events within hospitals was carried out using the generalized estimating equation approach (30) .
RESULTS
Thirteen hospitals in Utah and 15 in Colorado participated in the study. There were two major teaching hospitals (one from each state), eight minor teaching hospitals (two in Utah, six in Colorado), and 18 nonteaching hospitals (ten in Utah, eight in Colorado); seven government-owned hospitals (two in Utah, five in Colorado), eight for-profit hospitals (four in Utah, four in Colorado), and 13 nonprofit hospitals (seven in Utah, six in Colorado); 20 urban hospitals (nine in Utah, 11 in Colorado) and eight rural (four in Utah, four in Colorado); and 15 small hospitals (seven in Utah, eight in Colorado) and 13 large hospitals (six in Utah, seven in Colorado).
We reviewed 14,700 (98.0 percent) of the 15,000 sampled records. Among these, nurse reviewers referred 2,868 records (19.5 percent) to physicians for further review. Physicians reviewed 2,820 (98.3 percent) of the referred records. The remainder were classified as missing.
Twenty-two physicians reviewed records for the study (16 in Utah and six in Colorado). The mean adverse event detection rate for the records referred by nurses to physicians for review was 19.2 percent in Colorado (range of mean ± SD, 2.6 ± 4.9 percent to 27.9 ± 2.8 percent) and 15.0 percent in Utah (range, 3.2 ± 6.2 percent to 53.8 ± 27 percent). On the basis of the quality control criteria, the reviews of one physician in Utah and two in Colorado (a total of 739 records reviewed) were discarded and redone by different reviewers. After these records were re-reviewed, the entire sample of adverse events was reviewed by investigators and 13 false-positive reviews were excluded.
Of the 500 records chosen for re-review as part of the reliability study, 488 were located and reviewed (97 of 100 adverse events and 391 of 400 nonadverse events). The percentage agreement for adverse events was 79 percent and the kappa was 0.4 (95 percent confidence interval (95% CI), 0.3 to 0.5). For the judgment of preventability, there was 91 percent agreement among the investigators, with a kappa of 0.81. Disagreements were discussed and consensus reached.
Owing to the large sample, there were statistically significant differences in most patient characteristics by hospital ownership (Table 1) . Major teaching government-owned hospitals cared for fewer patients older than 65 years, but more 45 to 64 years old than other types of hospitals. For-profit hospitals cared for fewer uninsured and Medicaid patients and more patients with private or other insurance. Major teaching government-owned hospitals had more patients with the highest Charlson scores, and nonprofit hospitals had more patients with the lowest Charlson scores.
We detected 587 adverse events in Utah and Colorado (31) . Of these, 170 were judged preventable and also occurred in the sampled hospitals. Examples are listed in Table 2 . The mean rates of preventable adverse events are shown in Table 3 .
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Drug-related event
• A 44-year-old woman was admitted with an asthma exacerbation. During the hospitalization she was given a nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drug despite a previous history of an allergic reaction (bronchospasm) to this group of medications. This medication worsened her asthma.
• An 80-year-old woman developed digitalis toxicity due to inadequate monitoring.
Operative event
• A 39-year-old woman underwent a laparoscopic cholecystectomy and three days later developed fever and abdominal pain due to a bile leak.
• A 60-year-old man underwent coronary artery bypass surgery. Afterward he had a foot drop due to pressure placed on the perineal nerve during surgery.
Delayed or incorrect diagnoses and therapies
• A 34-year-old woman with history of inflammatory bowel disease was admitted with abdominal pain, disorientation, fever, and a white blood cell count of 26,000 with a left shift. Three days after admission she died, and the autopsy showed gangrenous bowel. She was in the hospital for three days without a clear diagnosis and without a surgical evaluation. No vital signs were recorded during the last 12 hours of admission.
• A 91-year-old woman was admitted for cholecystitis. For two days prior to surgery she was given intravenous fluids for presumed volume depletion without monitoring of pulmonary examinations, weight, or urinary output. She subsequently developed congestive heart failure that prolonged her hospital stay.
Medical procedure adverse events
• A 55-year-old man underwent percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty and suffered dissection of the left main coronary artery.
• A 73-year-old woman with syncope due to arrhythmia had a pacemaker inserted. However, the syncope continued because the pacemaker wire was improperly placed.
Multivariate analyses adjusting for other hospital and patient characteristics demonstrated that, when compared with patients in nonprofit hospitals, patients in minor or nonteaching government-owned hospitals were more likely to have preventable adverse events of any type (odds ratio (OR), 2.40; 95% CI, 1.39 to 4.15), preventable operative adverse events (OR, 4.78; 95% CI, 2.43 to 9.41), and preventable adverse events due to delayed or incorrect diagnoses and therapies (OR, 4.23; 95% CI, 1.45 to 12.26).
Patients in for-profit hospitals were more likely than patients in nonprofit hospitals to suffer preventable adverse events of any type (OR, 1.54; 95% CI, 1.00 to 2.40), preventable operative adverse events (OR, 1.54; 95% CI, 1.43 to 4.99), and preventable adverse events due to delayed or incorrect diagnoses and therapies (OR, 4.05; 95% CI, 1.79 to 9.13). Patients in major teaching government-owned hospitals were less likely to suffer preventable adverse drug events (OR, 0.37; 95% CI, 0.16 to 0.84). The results of five logistic regression analyses are presented in Table 4 . (20) 0.06 ± 0.10 (1) 0.46 ± 0.18 (8) 0.23 ± 0.13 (4) 0.23 ± 0.13 (4) 0.17 ± 0.12 (3) 2.02 ± 0.29 (48) 0.17 ± 0.10 (4) 1.09 ± 0.22 (26) 0.38 ± 0.14 (9) 0.17 ± 0.10 (4) 0.21 ± 0.11 (5) 1.12 ± 0.18 (38) 0.15 ± 0.07 (5) 0.53 ± 0.13 (18) 0.26 ± 0.09 (9) 0.09 ± 0.06 (3) 0.09 ± 0.06 (3) 0.92 ± 0.12 (64) 0.12 ± 0.04 (8) 0.35 ± 0.07 (24) 0.13 ± 0.05 (9) 0.14 ± 0.05 (10) 0.19 ± 0.06 (13) a Values as means ± standard error; number of events in parentheses. 
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DISCUSSION
We found that the quality of inpatient medical care, as measured by the occurrence of preventable adverse events, varied by hospital ownership in Utah and Colorado in 1992. Preventable adverse events of any type occurred more often to patients in minor teaching or nonteaching government-owned hospitals than to patients in nonprofit hospitals. These government-owned hospitals also experienced a higher frequency of adverse events in two specific categoriespreventable operative adverse events and preventable adverse events due to delayed or incorrect diagnoses and therapies. Similarly, for-profit ownership, compared with nonprofit ownership, was also significantly associated with preventable adverse events of any type, with preventable operative adverse events, and with preventable adverse events due to delayed or incorrect diagnoses and therapies.
Our results relate to the existing literature on hospital ownership and quality of care in several ways. First, our study adds empirical data to the ongoing debate about whether government should intervene to protect nonprofit hospitals (32) . Proponents of government intervention argue that nonprofit hospitals yield important social benefits compared with for-profit hospitals, including research, free care to the poor, and community-based education and disease prevention (33) . However, it is not clear whether these activities are inherently a part of nonprofit ownership and thereby generalizable to all nonprofit hospitals. Rather, these social benefits may be due to hospital characteristics such as teaching status or religious affiliation. Given this and other uncertainties, the potential costs of government intervention to encourage nonprofit ownership may outweigh the benefits (32) . Our study suggests that quality of care as measured by preventable adverse events is another factor that should be considered in this debate.
Second, although we did not directly measure financial characteristics of our hospitals, from the existing literature we hypothesize that government-owned, publicly supported hospitals may have been hampered by insufficient financial resources, a factor that previous studies have connected with substandard care (21) (22) (23) . Because they are dependent on government allocations, public hospitals can face restrictions in funding when tax revenues decrease or other competing interests claim public support (34) . Data from Colorado suggest that many small government-owned hospitals experienced financial losses in 1992 (35) .
Concerning for-profit hospitals, it is also possible that these events may be the result of fewer financial resources available for clinical care after profits are redirected to shareholders. For example, there are anecdotal reports about staff reductions, replacement of registered nurses with less-qualified personnel, less investment in equipment, and earlier discharges in for-profit hospitals (18, 19, 36, 37) . Empirical studies have found lower adverse event rates associated with increased percentage of registered nurses, but these studies did not explicitly address the influence of hospital ownership (38, 39) . However, other studies have found no relationship between nurse staffing and adverse events (40, 41) . In summary, it is possible that the availability of adequate funds for patient care activity is as important as the type of ownership.
It is probably simplistic, however, to believe that profit motive at the level of hospital ownership is uniformly harmful to patients. Moreover, for-profit hospital systems state they are committed to better-quality health care and believe that such commitment brings more profit (42) (43) (44) .
Third, our results are consistent with current thinking about the effects of organizational characteristics and systems on the occurrence of errors. Leape (45) has argued that errors committed by health care professionals are often the result of system failures rather than purely the fault of the individual who committed the error. His reasoning arises in part from the experience of other industries, which has shown that accidents are often the end result of a chain of events due to "latent" errors that exist within a system (46, 47) . The exact nature of such latent system errors is in turn determined by overlying organizational features of the system, such as who owns the system and the regulatory environment within which it functions (48) . Although traditional efforts to control errors in medicine have focused on individual health care providers (e.g., peer review and medical malpractice) (49), these new theories recognize that humans will always make errors, that some errors are due to organizational characteristics, and that the best way to prevent errors and adverse events is to change the systems within which individuals work. Our findings lend empirical support to these ideas by linking an organizational characteristic (hospital ownership) to the occurrence of preventable adverse events.
The generalizability of our results is one important limitation. Our results reflect care provided to hospitalized patients in Utah and Colorado in 1992, and given the heterogeneity of for-profit hospital chains and state and local governments, our findings may only apply to the hospitals we studied. Nonprofit hospitals may be adopting some of the same cost-cutting practices that might have increased the incidence of some preventable adverse events in for-profit and government-owned hospitals. In addition, some states more closely regulate their hospitals than do Utah and Colorado, or simply have dramatically different economic and geographic features affecting hospitals.
The reliability of physician judgments about adverse events and reliance on medical records to detect events are other limitations. Reanalysis of the Harvard Medical Practice Study data has highlighted disagreement between reviewers, and we hypothesized that some of this disagreement could be due to individual reviewers who did not properly learn study criteria. Although the reliability of adverse event judgments was not perfect, it was similar to the reliability of commonly used diagnostic tests such as screening mammography (kappa, 0.47) (50), and the RAND methodology for estimating overuse of hysterectomy (kappa, 0.52) (51). Furthermore, although disagreement in reviewers' judgment about adverse events affects the estimate of the absolute number of adverse events, any misclassification was likely to be randomly distributed among the patient and hospital characteristics (52) . Therefore, associations between these characteristics and adverse events appear valid.
Our method of reviewing inpatient medical records to identify adverse events has other limitations. First, adequate documentation must be present in the record to identify adverse events. Second, we did not count adverse events that may have resulted in increased intensity of care if they did not prolong hospital stay or cause disability at discharge. Third, our hospital selection ensured a representative sample (for the characteristics size, location, teaching status, and ownership), but the hospitals within each stratum were not randomly selected. Therefore, selection bias could have lowered our estimates of the adverse event rates if hospitals with poor quality of care did not participate. However, all the hospitals approached agreed to participate, and the investigators had no knowledge of any hospital's adverse event rates prior to the study.
Detection bias related to variation in documentation or reviewer bias was also possible, but we do not suspect that these types of events were better documented in for-profit or government-owned hospitals than in nonprofit hospitals. Although reviewers might have known the ownership status of the hospitals, they were not aware of the hypothesis of this analysis.
Our results suggest several avenues for future research. We agree with Mitchell and Shortell (53) , who in their recent review of adverse outcomes and organization of care delivery concluded that adverse events may be one of the more sensitive indicators of quality problems related to organizational factors. We need to identify and better measure adverse events that are logically related to structures and processes of care (49) , in addition to considering psychological theories about why errors occur (47) and systems analyses of adverse events (48, 54) .
To conclude, this study supports concerns about the rapidly growing for-profit hospital sector's effect on the quality of medical care, while also finding significant quality problems in minor teaching or nonteaching government-owned hospitals in Utah and Colorado. Our findings should prompt more research into how hospital ownership affects quality of care. They might also be considered by regulators when considering conversions of nonprofit to for-profit hospitals, and they should encourage state and local governments to more thoroughly evaluate quality in their nonteaching government-owned hospitals.
